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1. Introduction 
The Austrian pension system is a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) pension scheme with defined 
benefits. Because of this setup, the system is particularly vulnerable to the aging population 
and the shrinking labour force. To counteract this institutional problem, the General Pensions 
Act of 2004 was passed (Allgemeines Pensionsgesetz, APG). Before this reform, calculating 
an individual’s pension claim only focused on the best years of one’s employment career. 
Under the new regulation, a person’s whole employment career is taken into account. In a 
transitory period until about 2050, grandfathering applies for entitlements acquired under the 
old system. In a nutshell, the current legal situation can be described as follows: 
- For people who started their career after 2005 and/or were born after 1990, the new 
pension system applies completely; 
- For people born before 1955, the old system applies;  
- For all in between, a mixture of both systems applies, the new system being more 
prominent in the pension calculation if people were born in more recent years. Since 
the first of January 2014, notwithstanding the consideration of different rules, the 
accumulating pension claims became more transparent, as all people born after 
1955 got an individual account (“Pensionskonto”) which contains their pension 
claims.
1
 
In this paper, we analyse the distributional and incentive effects in the Austrian pension 
system, with a focus on the redistribution within the system. A more equal distribution is a 
basic goal of society. Depending on inequality aversion, adequate redistribution adds to a 
nation’s welfare, in spite of the distortions created by the tax transfer mechanism (Hochman 
and Rodgers, 1969; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Sinn, 1995). For the government and 
voters to be informed about the nature and direction of redistribution, it should be done 
explicitly, rather than implicitly, within a social security system, and should be coordinated 
with the general tax transfer mechanism to achieve a desired and coherent total amount of 
redistribution. For this reason, a clear separation of insurance and redistribution is necessary 
where old age insurance is provided by an actuarially fair pension system, and redistribution 
is achieved by progressive taxes on higher earnings and income supplements and transfers 
at the lower end of the distribution. If redistribution is eliminated by imposing actuarial 
fairness, then people should be compensated by explicit transfers to maintain the desired 
level of redistribution, subject to the usual democratic debate. If imposing actuarial fairness 
eliminates implicit intergenerational distribution, a transitional compensation scheme is 
necessary that ensures a balanced intergenerational distribution as well. To the best of our 
                                                     
1
 For an overview of all rules and regulations concerning the Austrian pension system see Bundeskanzleramt (2015) 
or Pensionsversicherungsanstalt (2015b). Section 3.2.2 shows an example for the transition period. 
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knowledge there is no related literature that quantifies the implicit distributional effects within 
the Austrian Pension System. 
Our analysis of incentive effects is related to the literature on labour market incentives and 
the employment of older workers in Austria (e.g., Jaag et al., 2010; Keuschnigg and 
Keuschnigg, 2004; Mara and Narazani, 2011; Staubli and Zweimüller, 2013). In contrast to 
this literature, we focus on the decision to retire. The closest study to our investigation is, 
therefore, Gruber and Wise (2002) and Hofer and Koman (2006) for Austria.  
We use the concepts of Social Security Wealth (SSW) and the Net SSW Ratio to determine 
the distributional and incentive effects (Gruber and Wise, 2002). We mainly study four 
scenarios using the data of people who retired in 2010. The first scenario is the status quo. 
As stated above, the pension reform of 2004 brought new regulations; however, for people 
who retired in 2010, the pre-reform regulations apply. In the second scenario, we simulate 
the full implementation of the APG, not considering the transition period. Thereby, we take 
the employment pattern as given and focus on the change in the distributional and incentive 
effects due to the new system. As a third scenario, we simulate a simple Notional Defined 
Contribution (NDC) system. To separate the explicit and implicit redistribution, we simulate in 
a fourth scenario a pure NDC system without non-contribution-based pension benefits. 
Besides the distributional and incentives measures, we provide descriptive statistics for all 
scenarios of the earliest possible retirement age, the average pension amount, and gross 
replacement rates. All measures and statistics are reported separately for men and women. 
All reported monetary values are Euros (€) of the year 2014.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes our 
data and method. In Section 3, we present our results by first illustrating the situations of 
new pensioners in the year 2010. After that, we analyse the distributional effects for the 
different scenarios of the Austrian pension system. Subsequently, we focus on the explicit 
and implicit redistribution in the APG system. In the last subsection, we show the retirement 
incentives in various pension systems. In the final section, we present our conclusions.  
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2. Data and Method 
To calculate the distributional and incentive effects in the Austrian pension system, we use 
the IHS-Microsimulation-Model-for-REtirement-Behaviour-in-Austria (IREA) (Hanappi et al., 
2012). This state-of-the-art microsimulation model is based on the administrative data of all 
employees (except civil servants) subject to social insurance contributions. Our data 
comprises people who were entitled to receive a pension in 2010.  
We exclude survivor’s pensions and all people retiring before 55. In our analysis, we focus 
on the old-age-pension system; thus, we need people with careers ending reasonably close 
to statutory retirement age. Furthermore, we exclude people with additional pension claims 
from working abroad as we are not able to model their pension claims correctly. In our 
dataset, this applies to about 20% of the observations. 
From this dataset, we draw a sample of 15,000 people. Table 1 compares this sample with 
the overall number of new pension claims in 2010 according to official numbers. Please note 
that the official numbers contain people with cross-national pension claims. Furthermore, 
retirement age is not restricted, while we restrict it to at least 55. This second point explains 
the larger share of old age pensions in our sample. Looking at the retirement age in the 
official numbers, we see that the average retirement age into an invalidity pension lies below 
our restriction of 55; thus, we exclude a large share of invalidity pensions in our sample. The 
fact that the retirement age of old age pensions in our sample is lower than in the official 
numbers might be due to the exclusion of foreign pension claims, as the retirement age of 
people living abroad is significantly higher than of people living in Austria (Sozialministerium, 
2014).  
Table 1: Comparison sample and official numbers (2010) 
 
Number of individuals  Share of individuals Retirement age 
 
Sample Total Sample Total Sample Total 
Women 7,431 45,938 53% 49% 58.1 57.1 
Old age 
pensions 
6,753 35,264 91% 77% 58.3 59.3 
Invalidity 
pensions 
678 10,674 9% 23% 56.8 50.1 
Men 6,537 48,577 47% 51% 61.3 59.1 
Old age 
pensions 
4,747 29,658 73% 61% 61.3 62.6 
Invalidity 
pensions 
1,790 18,919 27% 39% 57.6 53.5 
Source: IREA (2015), OPIS (Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection, 
http://www.dnet.at/opis [11.09.2015] 
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To examine the distributional effects in the Austrian pension system, we calculate the Net 
SSW for every individual at planning age S and given retirement age R (e.g., Gruber and 
Wise, 2002; Hanappi et al., 2014): 
Equation 1: Net SSW 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑖 = ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑣𝑡
∞
𝑡=𝑅
⋅ 𝛿𝑡−𝑆 −  ∑ 𝑐𝑡 ⋅ 𝑤𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑣𝑡
𝑅−1
𝑡=𝑆
⋅ 𝛿𝑡−𝑆 − ∑ 𝑐𝑡 ⋅ 𝑤𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝛿
𝑡−𝑆
𝑆
𝑡=0
 
The first term on the right-hand side describes the payout stream after retiring in period t = 
R. The individual`s pension is denoted by 𝑏𝑖𝑡.The probability to survive until age t given 
survival until age S is given by 𝑣𝑡. The discount rate is 𝛿 = 1/(1 + 𝑟). In the following 
analysis, we assume a real internal rate of return r of 1%. Of course, nominal values were 
transformed into real values before the internal rate is applied. The second term on the right-
hand side considers the contributions paid from planning age S until retirement age R. The 
contribution rate is 𝑐𝑡. The individual wage is 𝑤𝑖𝑡. The third term on the right-hand side 
includes the contributions paid until the planning age S. In the following analysis, the 
planning age will be the retirement age so that the second term becomes zero. 
When the Net SSW equals zero, the pension system is actuarially fair. A positive Net SSW 
indicates a positive transfer within the pension system. Over their remaining lifetime, people 
receive more from pensions than they contributed to the system. The remainder must be 
paid by other people or future generations.  
To detect a relative betterment or a less favourable treatment of different groups, we 
calculate the Net SSW Ratio:  
Equation 2: Net SSW Ratio 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑖  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑖
∑ 𝑐𝑡 ⋅ 𝑤𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑣𝑡
𝑅−1
𝑡=𝑆 ⋅ 𝛿
𝑡−𝑆 − ∑ 𝑐𝑡 ⋅ 𝑤𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝛿𝑡−𝑆
𝑆
𝑡=0
 
A Net SSW Ratio of zero indicates a balanced account. A set internal rate of return (in our 
calculations 1%) implies actuarial fairness. A positive Net SSW Ratio indicates the 
percentage of which the present value of the future pensions is larger than the present value 
of the contributions, e.g. a Net SSW Ratio of 0.5 indicates that the present value of the future 
pension is 50% larger than the present value of the contributions. A Net SSW Ratio of 1 
indicates that the present value of the future pension is twice as large as the present value of 
the contributions. A negative Net SSW Ratio indicates that the present value of the 
contributions is larger than the present value of the future pensions.  
To study the retirement incentive (Section 3.4) given by the pension system, we calculate the 
SSW (Börsch-Supan et al., 2004):  
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Equation 3: SSW 
𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑖 = ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑣𝑡
∞
𝑡=𝑅
⋅ 𝛿𝑡−𝑆 − ∑ 𝑐𝑡 ⋅ 𝑤𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑣𝑡 ⋅ 𝛿
𝑡−𝑆
𝑅−1
𝑡=𝑆
 
Equation 3 differs from Equation 1 as it only takes into account the future pension (first term 
from Equation 1) and the extra contributions (third term Equation 1) from planning age S 
onwards. When deciding whether to retire now or later, the contributions paid before the 
planning point S are sunk costs for the forward-looking individual.  
The pension system is neutral if postponing retirement does not change SSW, such that the 
SSW of retiring in t is equal to the SSW of retiring in t + 1. That means the extra contributions 
and foregone pension benefits are exactly compensated by the future pension increase. A 
positive SSW indicates overcompensation of the forgone pension benefits and extra 
contributions by the future pension increase. A negative SSW indicates the reverse case. 
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3. Results 
In the first step, we briefly discuss the Austrian pension reality by describing the situation of 
new pensioners in the year 2010. We focus on the earliest possible retirement into an old-
age pension
2
, and provide descriptive statistics on the average pension amount and the 
gross replacement rate in relation to the last income as well as in relation to the average 
income over the life cycle.  
In the second step, we study the distributional effects of different pension systems. In a 
calculation exercise, we use the employment pattern and retirement behaviour of the new 
APG system to analyse the status quo pension system, a fully implemented APG system and 
a simple NDC system for Austria. For the latter, we study with and without non-contribution-
based pension benefits. As a measure for the distributional effect, we calculate the Net SSW 
Ratio (Equation 2). We present gender-specific results as well as results for different lengths 
of the contribution period and for different income levels.  
In the third step, we focus particularly on the following question: Which share of the 
redistribution in the new Austrian pension scheme (APG) is explicit (by means of insurance 
years for child-rearing, sickness, unemployment, etc.) and which share is implicit (a higher 
pension than the covered by contributions)?  
In the fourth step, we focus on the incentive effect to retire. The SSW (Equation 3) provides 
an adequate measure for that purpose. We study the incentive effect again for the status 
quo, the APG and the NDC scenarios.  
3.1. Situation of New Pensioners for the Year 2010 
Retiring into an old-age pension in 2010 as soon as possible leads to quite a good income 
situation. The average gross pension per month is €1,231 for women and €2,043 for men 
(Table 2). This corresponds to a gross replacement rate in relation to the last income of 68% 
for women and 78% for men. Comparing the gross pension with the average gross income 
earned by pensioners during their lifetime, we find that pensions are higher than their 
average income: the gross replacement rates concerning the average income are 102% for 
women and 109% for men. The average earliest possible retirement age is 58.5 years for 
women and 61.5 years for men.  
Individuals in 2010 availed of the following pathways into retirement: 
                                                     
2
 As shown in Table 1, a significant share of our retirees retired due to invalidity. In this paper, we are less interested 
in the actual situation of retirees, but in the frame the system provides. We do not consider invalidity pensions, but 
simulate an old-age pension for every person. In the descriptive statistics, we observe every person at the earliest 
age an old-age pension can be claimed. Thus, the numbers differ from the numbers shown in Table 1. 
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- Old-age pension (Alterspension): retirement age 60 for women, 65 for men; 
- Long-term insured (Langzeitversichertenregel, “Hacklerregelung”): after 40 (women) 
and 45 (men) insurance years retirement at 55/60 without deductions
3
; 
- Early old-age pension due to a long insurance period (vorzeitige Alterspension bei 
langer Versicherungsdauer): expiring rule allowing early retirement with deductions; 
- Flexible retirement scheme (Korridorpension): early retirement at 62 with deductions 
after 37.5 insurance years; this retirement scheme is currently not relevant for 
women as their statutory retirement age lies below 60.
4
 
In Table 2, we divide our sample according to the possible pathways into retirement; most 
women (55%) can enter retirement with an old-age pension. These women do not have 
enough insurance years to enter into other pathways. Accordingly, the average pension is 
lowest for this group at €940 per month. In contrast, only 8% of men have this pathway into 
retirement. For men, the most common pathway is the long-term insured pension (51%), 
whereas 37% of women in our sample can enter this pension form. For both men and 
women, pensions are highest with this pension form. This is easily explained as people 
having access to a long-term insured pension dispose of a stable employment career (of at 
least 40 or 45 years). We see that the expiring rule of an early old-age pension due to a long 
insurance period loses importance with only 8% of women and almost no men entering this 
pension form. The flexible retirement regulation becomes important for men (40%), while 
with the statutory retirement age still being 60, no women use this pathway. 
                                                     
3
 The long-term insured pathway into retirement was subsequently changed, such that people born after 1954/1959 
can retire only at 62/57 with deductions. For women, the age will go up with the statutory retirement age increasing 
to 65. 
4
 The requirements to enter a flexible retirement scheme were subsequently changed, asking for more insurance 
years. Furthermore, deductions were increased. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of new pensioners in 2010 
  
Number of 
individuals  
Earliest 
possible 
retirement 
age  
Pension 
amount 
(2014 Euro) 
Gross 
replacement 
rate – last 
income* 
Gross 
replacement 
rate – 
average 
income* 
Women  7,931 58.5 1,231 68% 102% 
Old-age pension 4,330 60.2 940 68% 93% 
Long-term insured  2,943 56.1 1,616 66% 114% 
Early old-age pension 
due to a long insurance 
period 
648 57.9 1,414 83% 106% 
Flexible retirement 
scheme 
- - - - - 
Men 7,069 61.5 2,043 78% 109% 
Old-age pension 560 65.1 1,091 75% 78% 
Long-term insured 3,615 60.5 2,347 77% 117% 
Early old-age pension 
due to a long insurance 
period 
29 62.4 1,806 70% 95% 
Flexible retirement 
scheme 
2,862 62.0 1,847 80% 106% 
* Reference is the individual’s income. Incomes are truncated at the social contribution ceiling.  
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
3.2. Distributional Effects 
The APG did not only bring differences in the pension calculation. Additional reforms 
changed early retirement access such that the earliest possible retirement age is different in 
the 2010 legislation than in the APG legislation when completely due.
5
 The same is true for 
the NDC system we analyse: here, retirement is possible from 55 onwards for men and 
women – of course, with appropriate changes in pension height. To analyse the distributional 
effects for different pension systems, it is, however, necessary to compare them at identical 
                                                     
5
 The statutory retirement age of women will be 65. Access to the long-term insured pension is only at age 62. The 
early old-age pension due to a long insurance period ceases to exist. 
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retirement ages. Thus, we calculate the earliest possible retirement age in the APG system 
and apply this to all scenarios. We use IREA to simulate the working careers and calculate 
the individual pension claims. We calculate the individual pensions due to accumulated 
entitlements only and exclude supplements for low pensions to achieve the minimum 
pension level. 
Applying the employment and retirement patterns in all scenarios implies that the career 
patterns of the individuals do not change because of the new pension system. We are fully 
aware that this assumption does not match reality. For this reason, we see our analysis more 
as a calculation exercise examining the distributional effects of the different pension systems 
and not as an exact rebuild of the Austrian reality. Nevertheless, our approach allows us to 
study the distributional effects of the different systems in detail.  
We use the APG system as the benchmark case because it is enacted legislation in Austria. 
We study distributional effects for the status quo system, the APG system, and a simple NDC 
system. Furthermore, we calculate this same NDC system considering only the insurance 
months due to employment, and setting aside pension benefits that are not related to 
individual contributions. For all scenarios, we provide additional descriptive statistics.  
The distributional effects are measured via the Net SSW as given in Equation 1 and reported 
in Net SSW Ratio as given in Equation 2. Again, for a given internal rate of return,
6
 a Net 
SSW Ratio of zero indicates an actuarially fair pension. A positive Net SSW Ratio indicates a 
positive redistribution from the younger generation (current contribution payers and 
taxpayers) and current taxpayers. A negative Net SSW Ratio indicates a negative 
redistribution. The Net SSW Ratio shows how much the present value of future pensions is 
higher or lower than the present value of the contributions.  
3.2.1. The Status Quo 
The situation for new pensioners in the status quo is quite comfortable. The average pension 
is €1,595 for women and €2,070 for men. The gross replacement rates in regard to the last 
(average) income are 87% (131%) for women and 79% (110%) for men (Table 3).
7
  
                                                     
6
 We choose 1%. 
7
 Compared to Table 2, the numbers are higher as we calculate the pension claims at a later retirement age (+4.4 
years for women and +0.8 years for men). 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics Status Quo 
 
Number of 
individuals  
Earliest 
possible 
retirement age  
Pension 
amount (2014 
Euro) 
Gross 
replacement 
rate – last 
income* 
Gross 
replacement 
rate – average 
income* 
Women 7,931 62.9 1,595 87% 131% 
Men 7,069 62.3 2,070 79% 110% 
* Reference is the individual’s income. Incomes are truncated at the social contribution ceiling.  
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
The average Net SSW Ratio is about 1 in the status quo scenario (Figure 1). A Net SSW 
Ratio of 1 indicates a substantial positive redistribution effect of 100% from current 
contribution payers and current taxpayers toward current pensioners. For every Euro today’s 
pensioners have contributed to the pension system, they receive €2.00. Current taxpayers 
have to bear the federal subsidy, while future generations have to bear the high pension 
entitlements of today’s pensioners.  
A further gender-specific investigation shows that the effect is much more pronounced for 
women (Figure 1). The Net SSW Ratio is 1.67. A higher ratio is expected because only the 
best 15 years within the pension system were considered for the calculation of the monthly 
pension. Women often have no consistent employment careers; thus, they pay fewer 
contributions during their work life but are rewarded for their best working years. Additionally, 
women retire earlier and live longer than men. In contrast, men only got a Net SSW ratio of 
0.4.  
The relatively more favourable treatment of people with just a few contribution years also 
becomes very clear when studying the Net SSW Ratio in relation to the years of 
contributions (Figure 2). Especially, people who contributed less than 10 years to the 
pension system benefit strongly. The total value of benefits they obtain is 7.2 times larger 
than the total value of contributions they paid. However, for the next group (10 to 19 years of 
contributions), the Net SSW Ratio decreases to 2.15. For groups with more years of 
contributions, the Net SSW Ratio decreases further. For people with more than 50 years of 
contributions, the Net SSW decreases to 0.51. 
Also, people with a relatively small income benefit in the status quo. In particular, people with 
a lifetime income in the lowest 10% of the lifetime income distribution of our sample benefit 
the most by far. The total value of benefits is about 3.5 times higher than the total value of 
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contributions. With increasing income, the Net SSW Ratio decreases drastically. For 
example, the Net SSW Ratio for people in the fifth 10% quantile is 0.87 (Figure 3). 
Women and people with fewer years of contributions and low incomes benefit the most in the 
status quo. However, the redistribution is positive for all groups considered. This means 
there is a large intergenerational redistribution effect from current contribution payers and 
current taxpayers to current retirees. 
Figure 1: Net SSW Ratio Status Quo, All Pensioners, Women and Men 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
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Figure 2: Net SSW Ratio Status Quo, Years of Contribution 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
Figure 3: Net SSW Ratio Status Quo, Lifetime Income (10% Quantiles) 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
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3.2.2. The New Pension System APG 
Since 2005, for all people born after 1 January 1955, the insurance periods are calculated 
due to the new pension system (APG, “pension account”
8
). However, long transition periods 
apply. Introduction of the system foresaw that, at retirement, two pensions are calculated: 
one applying the old system, one applying the new system. The actual pension is then a 
weighted average of both pensions, with the share of insurance months before and after 
2005 operating as weights. With this system of parallel calculation, however, the benefit of 
larger transparency in the pension account system would only start in late 2040. Therefore, 
another reform in 2012 changed the way the pension is calculated. Instead of applying two 
parallel systems at retirement, all claims prior to 2014 are transferred to the account. Thus, 
every individual can see his or her current pension entitlement when looking at his or her 
pension account. However, with this reform, the pension levels were not changed, such that 
the new rules are still entirely valid only for people born after 1990. For the others, the 
pension size is a mixture between the old and new system.  
An example makes the pension calculation possibly more illustrative. Imagine a person born 
in 1960 who started to work in 1980 with a monthly income of €1,500. This income increases 
by 2% annually in real terms. The person works continuously until retiring at age 65. The 
new APG pension system would foresee a monthly gross pension of €1,950. The old system 
foresaw a monthly gross pension of €2,294. The actual pension will be €2,089. The transition 
system attenuates the pension cut of 15% foreseen by the APG to 9%. The attenuation is 
stronger for people born earlier and weaker for people born later.
9
 
In this paper, we are not interested in the transition period. We want to compare the status 
quo system with the new system, even if it is only fully in force in future years. Therefore, we 
act as if the new regulations have been fully implemented and take into account all periods 
of insurance, including those prior to 2005, as insurance periods in the new APG system. 
Another transition process concerns the statutory retirement age of women. Beginning in 
2024, it increases by half a year each year such that, by 2033, the statutory retirement age is 
65 for both men and women. In the following scenario, we again do not consider the 
transition, but act as if the statutory retirement age of women was already 65. As mentioned 
above, we do not consider invalidity pensions. In reality, of course invalidity pensions are still 
possible.  
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for this simulation of an APG fully in force. With the 
same employment pattern and retirement behaviour as assumed in Table 3, the average 
                                                     
8
 From the beginning of the working career, the future entitlements are noted on a fictive account.  
9
 These numbers are only true for this example of a person with a steady insurance career. For people with 
interrupted insurance careers, the pension cut due to APG is larger, as will be shown in the following pages. For 
more information on pension calculations see Pensionsversicherungsanstalt (2015b). 
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pension amount as well as the gross replacement rates drop significantly compared to the 
status quo. The average pension amount is €1,152 for women and €1,651 for men. These 
values correspond to a gross replacement rate concerning the last income of 68% for 
women and 64% for men and a gross replacement rate concerning the average income of 
98% for women and 89% for men.  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics APG 
  
Number of 
individuals  
Earliest 
possible 
retirement 
age  
Pension 
amount 
(2014 Euro) 
Gross 
replacement 
rate – last 
income* 
Gross 
replacement 
rate – 
average 
income* 
Women 7,931 62.9 1,152 66% 98% 
Men 7,069 62.3 1,651 63% 89% 
* Reference is the individual’s income. Incomes are truncated at the social contribution ceiling.  
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
In the new APG system, the redistribution effect becomes smaller for men and women. The 
average Net SSW Ratio is about 0.7. For every Euro contributed, there is a pension benefit 
of €1.70. There are still huge differences between men and women (Figure 4). The Net SSW 
Ratio for women is 1.16, whereas it is 0.19 for men.  
Also, the redistribution for the different groups of contribution years and for the different 
lifetime-income quantiles declined. In the APG, there is still an immense redistribution 
towards people with only a few years of contributions (Figure 5). With less than 10 
contribution years, the Net SSW Ratio is 7.98. This group consists of mostly women, so this 
high redistribution coefficient might be driven by the relatively high share of contribution 
years because of child-rearing periods. With more contribution years, the Net SSW Ratio 
again drops drastically. Compared to the status quo scenario, the Net SSW Ratio in the APG 
is lower for all groups with more than 10 years of contributions. 
Analogous to the status quo, the redistribution also decreases in the APG for all groups with 
the lifetime income. For the top 50% of the income distribution, the Net SSW Ratio is below 
0.3. For the highest 20% of the lifetime income distribution, we find basically actuarial 
fairness. For the highest 10% quantile, the Net SSW Ratio is even negative with a value of -
0.06 (Figure 6). 
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Figure 4: Net SSW Ratio APG, All Pensioners, Women and Men 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
Figure 5: Net SSW Ratio APG, Years of Contribution 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
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Figure 6: Net SSW Ratio APG, Lifetime Income (10% Quantiles) 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
3.2.3. NDC System  
Since the 1990s, several countries have introduced an NDC pension system (Holzmann et 
al., 2012, 2013). Probably, the most famous NDC system was introduced in Sweden 
(Könberg et al., 2006; Schoyen and Stamati, 2013; Swedish Pensions Agency, 2014). An 
NDC system is a PAYGO pension system with notional accounts that follows two principles. 
First, the relative position in the monthly pension benefit distribution is directly linked to the 
relative height of pension contributions over the years. Second, the same contributions lead 
to the same pension entitlements. The individual entitlements are accumulated on the 
individual notional account. At the time of entering retirement, the individual pension is 
calculated based on the individual account. An NDC system is actuarially fair, and to ensure 
this, life expectancy is taken into account to calculate the monthly pension benefit.  
We use the Swedish system as a model for a simple NDC system for Austria. The Swedish 
system has a fixed contribution rate of 18.5%, of which 16% is contributed to the NDC 
system, and the remaining 2.5% to a funded system. For our adaptation, we use the 
respective currently valid contribution rates in Austria and do not consider a funded system. 
In the Swedish system, the individual pension entitlements as well as the individual monthly 
pension is indexed with the annual growth rate of the consumer price index and the annual 
growth rate of gross wages per capita. We apply the same indexation in our NDC scenario.  
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In our scenario, the monthly pension is calculated by dividing the individual accumulated 
accounts by an individual annuity divisor. We use the conditional life expectancy of men and 
women at the time of retirement as the annuity divisor.
10
 In order to achieve a unisex life 
expectancy, we compute the weighted average of the two conditional life expectancies using 
the share of the sexes in the population.  
An NDC pension system is by construction self-financing. In a PAYGO pension system, 
today’s contributions are used to pay today’s pensions. If the budget is not balanced in the 
Swedish system, the financial burdens are distributed among contributors and pensioners. 
Both groups have to accept deductions during the balancing, but there are no long-lasting 
level effects of the balancing. When balancing ends, the monthly pension is the same as it 
would have been without balancing.
11
 We do not simulate the balancing mechanism for 
Austria due to data limitations. Thus, in our NDC scenario, we focus on whether or not the 
individual pension is funded by individual contributions. We do not consider whether the total 
pension expenditures are in line with total pension contributions. 
Furthermore, we include all pension benefits not covered by individual contributions as they 
are in the current pension system, e.g. child-rearing. We apply the Swedish flexible 
retirement age. In our simulation, it is possible to retire between 55 and 70 with an 
accordingly adjusted annuity divisor. In contrast to Sweden, we do not allow for partly 
pensions while still working. We also use the Austrian regulations concerning child-rearing 
periods.  
In contrast to the APG system, the pension level is significantly lower. The average pension 
amount is €794 for women and €1,188 for men. The gross replacement rates of the last 
income are 45% for both men and women. The replacement rate of the average income is 
67% for women and 63% for men (Table 5).  
                                                     
10
 Specifically, we use the conditional life expectancy of men and women of the birth cohort of 1955 reported for the 
year 2011 (Statistik Austria, 2015). 
11
 In times with an unbalanced budget, the indexations of the individual accounts as well as the indexations of 
monthly pensions are attenuated. Balancing is active as long as the so-called balance index is smaller than 1. The 
balance index is the product of the income index and the so-called balance ratio. The balance ratio is the relation of 
the asset of contributions plus the asset of the pension buffer fund to the pension liability. The balancing attenuates 
the pension liability and, therewith, increases the balancing ratio. Since the balancing ends only when the balance 
index is again at least 1, the value of the individual account and the value of the monthly pensions are at the same 
value as they would have been without balancing. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics NDC 
  
Number of 
individuals  
Earliest 
possible 
retirement 
age as in 
APG 
Pension 
amount 
(2014 Euro) 
Gross 
replacement 
rate – last 
income* 
Gross 
replacement 
rate – 
average 
income* 
Women 7,931 62.9 794 45% 67% 
Men 7,069 62.3 1,188 45% 63% 
* Reference is the individual’s income. Incomes are truncated at the social contribution ceiling.  
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
As expected, there is much less redistribution in the NDC system. The average Net SSW 
Ratio is just 0.23. The Net SSW Ratio of women is 0.52 whereas it is -0.10 for men (Figure 
7). The negative redistribution effect for men is driven by the unisex life expectancy. Their 
pension is calculated with the unisex life expectancy, but their gender-specific life 
expectancy is lower. For women, the effect of the unisex life expectancy is the reverse.  
The redistribution effect towards people with only a few years of contributions also 
decreases drastically. The Net SSW Ratio for people with less than 10 years of contributions 
in the NDC scenario is 5.2. All other groups show a Net SSW Ratio below 1. For people with 
more than 50 years of contributions, the ratio is even negative with a value of -0.1 (Figure 8).  
Concerning lifetime incomes, there is a strong redistribution effect from high income earners 
towards low income earners. For the top 50% of the income distribution, the Net SSW Ratio 
is negative, whereas it is positive for the bottom 50% of the distribution. This redistribution is 
because of the higher lifetime income of men, who are penalized by the unisex life 
expectancy. Furthermore, more people with low lifetime incomes benefit from pension 
benefits not covered by individual contributions. The strongest redistribution effect is still 
towards people in the bottom 10% of the income distribution, but the Net SSW Ratio, with a 
value of 1.94, is far smaller than in the previous scenarios (Figure 9).  
This simulation highlights that with a simple NDC system for Austria, the indirect 
redistribution can be drastically reduced. At the same time, the average pension levels would 
decline. To compensate that explicit redistribution is needed.  
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Figure 7: Net SSW Ratio NDC, All Pensioners, Women and Men 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
Figure 8: Net SSW Ratio NDC, Years of Contribution 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
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Figure 9: Net SSW Ratio NDC, Lifetime Income (10% Quantiles) 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
3.2.4. Pure NDC System 
To separate the intended explicit redistributions from the implicit redistributions within the 
pension system, we also simulate the NDC system for Austria without pension claims 
because of child-rearing periods, civil and military service, illness and unemployment.  
Excluding pension benefits which are not due to individual contributions, the average 
pension amount decreases further significantly for women and slightly for men. The average 
pension is then €671 for women and €1,141 for men. The corresponding average gross 
replacement rates of the last income are 35% for women and 42% for men. The average 
gross replacement rates of the average income are 53% for women and 59% for men (Table 
6). 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics pure NDC 
  
Number of 
individuals  
Earliest 
possible 
retirement 
age  
Pension 
amount 
(2014 Euro) 
Gross 
replacement 
rate – last 
income* 
Gross 
replacement 
rate – 
average 
income* 
Women 7,931 62.9 671 35% 53% 
Men 7,069 62.3 1,141 42% 59% 
* Reference is the individual’s income. Incomes are truncated at the social contribution ceiling.  
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
As it should be, the pure NDC system is actuarially fair with an average Net SSW Ratio of 
close to zero. In our simulation, it is -0.07. For women, the Net SSW Ratio is slightly positive 
with a value of 0.06. For men, it is negative with a value of -0.2 (Figure 10).  
In regard to years of contributions, the pure NDC system is actuarially fair. The Net SSW 
Ratio ranges between 0.13 for people with less than 10 years of contributions to -0.13 for 
people with more than 50 years of contributions (Figure 11). Also, for the lifetime income, the 
system is actuarially fair. The Net SSW Ratio ranges from 0.13 for the lowest 10% of the 
income distribution to -0.28 for the highest 10% of the income distribution (Figure 12). 
A pure NDC system for Austria removes all redistribution within the pension system and is 
actuarially fair. 
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Figure 10: Net SSW Ratio Pure NDC, All Pensioners, Women and Men  
 Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
Figure 11: Net SSW Pure NDC, Years of Contribution 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
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Figure 12: Net SSW Pure NDC, Lifetime Income (10% Quantiles) 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
3.3. Explicit and Implicit Redistribution 
The fact that the presented pure NDC system removes all redistribution within the Austrian 
pension system enables us to disentangle the explicit and the implicit redistribution within the 
system. We study the explicit and implicit redistribution in the APG system, because it is the 
applicable pension system in Austria according to law.  
How do we separate the implicit from the explicit redistribution? We showed that our simple 
pure NDC system is actuarially fair. Therefore, in the pure NDC system there are only 
pension benefits because of individual contributions. To calculate the whole redistribution in 
the APG system, we subtract the pure NDC pension from the APG pension. To calculate the 
implicit redistribution, we subtract from the whole redistribution the part of the pension which 
is not granted because of own contributions, e.g. child-rearing periods, military or community 
service. Table 7 shows our calculation procedure.  
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Table 7: Calculation of implicit redistribution in the APG system  
APG Pension 
- Pure NDC Pension 
= Whole Redistribution within the APG Pension 
- explicit redistribution 
= implicit redistribution 
Source: own representation. 
Figure 13 shows the average implicit and explicit redistribution for all pensioners, women 
and men. The average individual contribution to pension benefits in the APG system is €893. 
On average, the implicit redistribution is €360 and the explicit redistribution is €131. For 
women, the implicit redistribution is €289 and the explicit redistribution is €187. For men, the 
implicit redistribution is larger (€439) in absolute values, whereas the explicit redistribution is 
smaller (€68). Table 8 shows that the relative share of the implicit redistribution on the total 
individual pension is pretty much the same for men and women. The implicit redistribution is 
proportional to the individual contribution. The explicit redistribution is higher for women due 
to child-rearing periods.  
Figure 13: Explicit and Implicit Redistribution, All Pensioners, Women and Men 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
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Table 8: Relative shares of individual contributions and redistribution on the individual pension, 
all pensioners, women and men 
 Women Average  Men 
Individual contribution 58% 65% 69% 
Explicit redistribution 16% 9% 4% 
Implicit redistribution 25% 26% 27% 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
People with less than 10 years of contributions receive the highest explicit redistribution. On 
average, they receive €372 of explicit redistribution. This amount decreases to €54 in the 
group of people with more than 50 years of contributions. Pension benefits due to individual 
contributions increase from €115 to €1,185. The implicit redistribution increases with the 
years of contributions from €45 to €526 (Figure 14). In the group with less than 10 years of 
contributions, with 70%, explicit redistribution is by far the most important component of the 
individual pension. For people with more than 50 years of contributions, the share is 
negligibly small with 3%. The share of individual contributions on the individual pensions 
increases with years of contributions from 22% to 67%. Analogously, the share of implicit 
redistribution increases from 8% to 30% (Table 9). 
Figure 14: Explicit and Implicit Redistribution, Years of Contribution 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
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Table 9: Relative shares of individual contributions and redistribution on the individual pension, 
years of contribution 
 
<10 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50+ 
Individual 
Contribution 
22% 38% 52% 60% 69% 67% 
Explicit 
Redistribution 
70% 43% 27% 17% 11% 3% 
Implicit 
Redistribution 
8% 19% 21% 23% 20% 30% 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
The pension because of individual contributions increases from €389 in the lowest decile of 
the lifetime income distribution to €1,565 in the highest decile. With respect to income, the 
indirect redistribution increases from €202 to €559. In contrast, the explicit redistribution 
decreases from €202 in the lowest decile to €96 in the highest decile (Figure 15). The 
analysis of redistribution concerning the lifetime income demonstrates that the high-income 
earners benefit the most in absolute values from indirect redistribution.  
As the implicit redistribution is proportional to individual contributions, the implicit 
redistribution across the income deciles is relatively constant, while the explicit redistribution 
decreases with a higher income (Table 10). 
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Figure 15: Explicit and Implicit Redistribution, Lifetime Income (10% Quantiles) 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
Table 10: Relative shares of individual contributions and redistribution on the individual 
pension, lifetime income (10% Quantiles) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Individual 
Contribution 
49% 53% 57% 60% 62% 65% 67% 69% 70% 71% 
Explicit 
Redistribution 
25% 24% 18% 14% 11% 8% 6% 4% 3% 4% 
Implicit 
Redistribution 
25% 23% 25% 26% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 25% 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
3.4. Incentive Effects 
Actuarial fairness is given when the present value of the pension corresponds to the present 
value of the contributions. This implies that the expected total sum of the pension received 
until death is neutral regarding the age of retirement. We study the incentive effects of the 
described scenarios, calculating the average monthly gross pension and the SSW as 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
E
u
ro
 
Individual Contribution Explicit Redistribution Implicit Redistribution
28 — Müllbacher, Nagl / Distributional and Incentive Effects — I H S 
described in Equation 3 for different retirement ages. As in the simulations before, we 
assume an interest rate of 1%. We compare the system of 2010, the APG, and the NDC as 
described in 3.2.3 and the pure NDC system as described in 3.2.4. 
Besides long-term insured people in the status quo, retiring before the legal retirement age 
leads to deductions in the amount of the monthly pension. For late retirement after the legal 
retirement age there are premiums. In the status quo and the APG, the monthly pension 
decreases between 0% and 4.2% for one year of early retirement, and increases by 4.2% for 
one year of late retirement. There is an exception for the corridor pension in the APG 
system. In the corridor pension, there is a deduction of 5.1% for one year of early retirement 
(Pensionsversicherungsanstalt, 2015a).  
In the NDC System, there are increases and deductions according to the annuity divisor (see 
Section 3.2.3). The divisor decreases with the retirement age, leading to a higher pension 
with postponed retirement. We allow for a flexible transition into retirement between the ages 
of 55 and 70.
12
  
Figure 16 and Figure 17 show the increase in the monthly gross pension when retirement 
age is postponed compared to the pension at the earliest possible retirement age. We find 
that the average gross pension increases for men and women in all systems with almost no 
difference between the NDC and the pure NDC. We find the lowest increase in the status 
quo pension system, with the difference being more pronounced for men than for women. 
This is due to two reasons: first, the status quo system offers a generous early retirement 
option (long-term insured, Langzeitversichertenregel) allowing retirement five years before 
the statutory retirement age without deductions; second, the status quo foresees maximum 
replacement rates. Both reasons are more important for men than for women, as more men 
are eligible for the long-term insured pension and more men reach the maximum 
replacement rate. The APG foresees the largest increase in the gross pension: deductions/ 
revaluations for early/late retirement and an increasing replacement rate with a longer 
contribution span are responsible for this. Please note, however, that these figures only show 
the different increases in pensions in the different systems. The large differences in the 
amount of pensions were already shown in the previous chapters (compare Table 3, Table 4, 
Table 5 and Table 6). In absolute terms, average pensions are highest for all in the status 
quo for men and women, with the increase in pensions less pronounced, as just shown. In 
absolute numbers, there is also a difference of pension claims in the NDC and pure NDC 
systems, especially for women, while there is no difference in the increase in pensions. 
Of course, when thinking about incentives, it is not only the monthly pension that counts, but 
also the number of years the pension is received. In an actuarially fair system, the foregone 
                                                     
12
 In the Swedish NDC system, it is not possible to retire before the age of 60. The Swedish annuity divisor is fixed 
at the age of 65.  
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pension due to a postponed retirement should be considered in the pension amount. The 
SSW, as described in Equation 3, takes this into account. 
Figure 16 and Figure 17 show the change in SSW calculated on the gross pension when 
retirement is postponed past the earliest possible age. For women, the status quo and the 
APG almost overcompensate for late retirement, while both NDC systems are rather neutral. 
For men, we see a different picture. While the APG overcompensates for late retirement, 
there are no incentives in the status quo to retire later than at the earliest possible age. The 
huge difference between men and women in the status quo is due to the two reasons 
mentioned above: more men are eligible for the generous (but not incentive neutral) long-
term insured pension, and more men reach the maximum replacement rate. Furthermore, as 
the life expectancy for men is lower than for women, to get an incentive neutral scheme men 
would need to be compensated more for postponing retirement. This different life expectancy 
is also crucial when explaining the differences in the NDC system between men and women. 
As explained in Section 3.2.3, for the NDC system we use the same unisex annuity divisor 
for men and women. This is calculated based on the average life expectancy. As women on 
average live longer than men, this gender neutral annuity divisor over compensates women 
and under compensates men for postponing retirement. On average, taking into 
consideration the share of men and women in the population of this age, the NDC system is 
incentive neutral. These figures only show the change in SSW when postponing retirement. 
Similar to the average gross pension, the size of SSW is, of course, very different for all 
systems.
13
  
We calculated the SSW based on the gross pension. Possibly the true incentive measure 
would be the SSW calculated on the net pension, as this might be the number of people to 
really take into account when deciding whether or not to retire. When we calculate the SSWs 
on the net pension, the incentives to postpone retirement decrease. This is due to the 
progressive tax system in Austria. The change in gross pension is higher than the change in 
net pension, especially for people with high pensions. In this paper, we focus on the gross 
pension, which more clearly marks the incentives of the pension system and does not 
intervene with the incentives of the tax system. 
                                                     
13
 Retiring at 65 implies an average SSW of €370,000 for men and €344,000 for women in the status quo, €332,000 
and €294,000 in the APG, and €194,000 and €168,000 in the NDC system. The smaller difference between men 
and women compared to the average gross pension is due to the longer life expectancy for women.  
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Figure 16: Change in Average Monthly Gross Pension for Postponing Retirement After the 
Earliest Possible Retirement Age, Men 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
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Figure 17: Change in Average Monthly Gross Pension for Postponing Retirement After the 
Earliest Possible Retirement Age, Women 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
Figure 18: Change in Gross SSW for Postponing Retirement After the Earliest Possible 
Retirement Age, Men 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
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Figure 19: Change in Gross SSW for Postponing Retirement After the Earliest Possible 
Retirement Age, Women 
 
Source: IREA (2015), own calculations. 
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4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we applied a microsimulation model on data that contain the entire pension 
insurance history of people who retired in Austria in 2010. We simulated the status quo, 
which is the pension system these people confronted when retiring, the new pension system 
already introduced, but still in transition (APG), and a simple NDC system for Austria. We 
compared the systems concerning their distributional and incentive effects.  
We found that the status quo contains substantial redistribution from working people and 
taxpayers to pensioners: On average, for every €1.00 contributed by today’s pensioners, 
they receive €2.00. The effect is much more pronounced for women than for men (women 
receive €2.67 for every €1.00 paid, while men receive €1.40). The effect is also more 
pronounced for people with few contribution years, and for people with lower incomes.  
The APG reduces this redistribution from current contributors and taxpayers to current 
pensioners. Pensions drop significantly, on average by 24%. The drop is higher for women. 
With more years in part-time and discontinuous careers, they suffer more from the fact that 
the whole employment career counts. However, we still found that for each €1.00 paid, an 
APG pensioner receives €1.70 in pension. The same patterns are visible here: a greater 
distribution to women, people with short careers and people with low incomes. Disentangling 
this distribution into explicit and implicit parts, we found that in the APG, on average, 65% of 
the pensions are paid by individual contributions, 9% by explicit redistribution such as 
remuneration for child-rearing periods, and 26% by implicit redistribution.  
In order to achieve sustainability and to reduce the distributional effects within the Austrian 
pension system, the introduction of the APG system helped significantly. When fully due, it 
will reduce the distributional effects slightly, increase the earliest possible retirement age 
significantly (for women we also consider the late but necessary adaption of the statutory 
retirement age), and reduce the monthly pensions. The latter is especially important to 
ensure sustainability. Given the careers of people who retired in 2010, a self-financed NDC 
pension would have decreased the average gross pension below the poverty threshold for 
women (€671) and not far above it for men (€1,141). These amounts are probably lower than 
desired by society, but the desired redistribution should be done explicitly. Child-rearing, for 
example, is an honourable and highly deliberated activity in society, and should be 
acknowledged in the course of pension claims. However, this should preferably be done 
explicitly with a separate pension for child-rearing, as an example. It might also be socially 
desirable to top up pensions out of the general budget, but again this should be done 
explicitly. By not separating redistribution from pension claims due to employment, the 
individual pension becomes a black box for most people. 
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Furthermore, making redistribution more explicit would lead to more informed decisions on 
how to use scarce public funds. One must note that the distributional premium per Euro of 
contribution we found for almost every considered group has to be paid into the pension 
system by the current contributors. More actuarial and, therewith, intergenerational fairness 
and transparency could be achieved through a pure NDC system, accompanied by explicit 
redistribution measures.  
Another important advantage of NDC systems not considered in this study, but which should 
nonetheless be mentioned here is that they automatically adapt to increasing life expectancy 
or a decreasing number of contributors – both relevant for the sustainability of a PAYGO 
system as we have in Austria. Introducing the APG leads to significant pension cuts. 
However, the full system is only due in 2050, when – possibly – more radical cuts will be 
needed given predicted demographic developments.  
All discussed features of an NDC system can, of course, be implemented in a defined benefit 
system. This might be politically more feasible, because to maintain the current level of 
pension benefits, the introduction of new and larger redistribution mechanisms would be 
necessary. To ensure sustainability for the Austrian pension system, it is crucially important 
to address the increasing life expectancy and the increasing old-age dependency ratio. 
Additionally, non-contribution-based benefits should be made explicit to make the pension 
system clearer and more transparent.   
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